Thursday, 13 October 2011

‘He gave joy and pleasure to millions of music lovers in India and abroad’


MUMBAI: The Indian singer and composer Jagjit Singh, who won generations of fans by reviving the traditional genre of “ghazal”music, died on Monday in a Mumbai hospital at the age of 70.
Singh, dubbed “The Ghazal King”, had been in intensive care for three weeks and underwent major surgery after collapsing with a brain haemorrhage before a concert in the city.
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh led the tributes, saying the singer’s appeal came through making ghazals – a poetic form of singing that spread to India from the Middle East in the 12th century – accessible to everyone.
“He gave joy and pleasure to millions of music lovers in India and abroad,” Singh said. “He was blessed with a golden voice.” Ghazals were traditionally reserved only for the elite, but Jagjit Singh popularised the form in the 1970s and 1980s by pioneering a modern sound and using Western instruments alongside Indian classical ones.
Besides spreading the appeal of ghazals in India, Singh sang and composed for Bollywood.
He will be best remembered for his music in popular films like “Prem Geet”(Love Song) in 1981 and “Arth” (Meaning) released the following year. He last sang in the low-budget film “Khushiyaan” (Happiness), which is due in cinemas on Friday.
Top Bollywood lyricist Javed Akhtar said Singh’s death was an “irreparable loss to the Hindi film and music industry.”Indian singer Lata Mangeshkar described his music as “intoxicating” and said he “sang from the heart”.
Singh’s classic ghazals, including “Chupke Chukpe Raat Din” (Silently, Night and Day) and “Tum Itna Jo Muskura Rahe Ho” (The Way You Smile), were popular studio recordings and featured often in concerts and movies.
Jagjit Singh was born to a poor family in the north Indian state of Rajasthan on February 8, 1941.
After moving to Mumbai to make his fortune, he found a foothold in regional-language and Bollywood cinema, going on to form a successful duo with his wife Chitra in the 1970s and 80s.
Chitra quit singing after the death of the couple’s only son, Vivek, in a road accident in the 1990s, while Singh sang fewer live concerts and his music took on a more spiritual and religious tone.
In 2007, Singh performed at India’s parliament building in New Delhi to mark the 150 years since the country’s first war of independence against British rule, also known in British history as the Indian Mutiny.
Singh was awarded India’s third-highest civilian honour, the Padma Bhushan, in 2003.

Kidnapped journalist returns


MIRAMSHAH, Oct 12: A journalist kidnapped by suspected militants about two months ago reached home here on Wednesday, after a deal was struck between the kidnappers and a jirga, sources said.
Rehmatullah Khan Derpakhel was kidnapped on Aug 11 from the main bazaar of Miramshah, they said.
Additional Political Agent M. Amin Khan confirmed that Mr Derpakhel had returned to his home, at around 9pm.
Mr Khan said a jirga formed by Khyber Pakhtunhwa Governor Masood Kausar had negotiated the deal with the kidnappers.
ex � e o �H~ � ~ ll end in civil war. It`s not my job to reassure them this time, because like most foreign journalists I can`t even get into the country, but in any case I would have no reassurance to offer. This time, it may well end in civil war. Like Iraq.
The Assad dynasty in Syria is neither better nor worse than Saddam Hussein`s regime was in Iraq. They had identical origins, as local branches of the same pan-Arab political movement, the Baath Party. They both depended on minorities for their core support: the Syrian Baathists on the 10 per cent Alawite (Shia) minority in that country, and the Iraqi Baathists on the 20 per cent of that country`s people who were Sunni Arabs.
They were both ruthless in crushing threats to their power. Hafez al-Assad`s troops killed up to 40,000 people in Hama when Sunni Islamists rebelled in Syria in 1982, Saddam Hussein`s army killed at least as many Shias in southern Iraq when they rebelled after the 1991 Gulf War, and both regimes were systematically beastly to their local Kurds.
When the American invaders destroyed Saddam Hussein`s regime in Iraq in 2003, however, what ensued was not peace, prosperity and democracy. It was a brutal civil war that ended with Baghdad almost entirely cleansed of its Sunni Muslim population and the whole country cleansed of its Christian minority. Only the Kurds, insulated by their own battle-hardened army and their mountains, avoided the carnage.
So if the Baathist regime in Syria is driven from power, why should we believe that what follows will be any better than it was in Iraq? The country`s ethnic and sectarian divisions are just as deep and complex as Iraq`s.

Civil war in Syria? By Gwynne Dyer


BACK in 1989, when the communist regimes of Europe were tottering towards their end, almost every day somebody would say `There`s going to be a civil war.` And our job, as foreign journalists who allegedly had their finger on the pulse of events, was to say: `No, there won`t be.`
So most of us did say that, as if we actually knew. But the locals were pathetically grateful, and we turned out to be right.
It was just the same in South Africa in 1993-94. Another non-violent revolution was taking on another dictatorship with a long record of brutality, and once again most people who had lived their lives under its rule were convinced there would be a civil war. So we foreign journalists (or at least some of us) reassured them that there wouldn`t be, and again we turned out to be right.
Now it`s Syria`s turn, and yet again most of the people who live there fear that their non-violent revolution will end in civil war. It`s not my job to reassure them this time, because like most foreign journalists I can`t even get into the country, but in any case I would have no reassurance to offer. This time, it may well end in civil war. Like Iraq.
The Assad dynasty in Syria is neither better nor worse than Saddam Hussein`s regime was in Iraq. They had identical origins, as local branches of the same pan-Arab political movement, the Baath Party. They both depended on minorities for their core support: the Syrian Baathists on the 10 per cent Alawite (Shia) minority in that country, and the Iraqi Baathists on the 20 per cent of that country`s people who were Sunni Arabs.
They were both ruthless in crushing threats to their power. Hafez al-Assad`s troops killed up to 40,000 people in Hama when Sunni Islamists rebelled in Syria in 1982, Saddam Hussein`s army killed at least as many Shias in southern Iraq when they rebelled after the 1991 Gulf War, and both regimes were systematically beastly to their local Kurds.
When the American invaders destroyed Saddam Hussein`s regime in Iraq in 2003, however, what ensued was not peace, prosperity and democracy. It was a brutal civil war that ended with Baghdad almost entirely cleansed of its Sunni Muslim population and the whole country cleansed of its Christian minority. Only the Kurds, insulated by their own battle-hardened army and their mountains, avoided the carnage.
So if the Baathist regime in Syria is driven from power, why should we believe that what follows will be any better than it was in Iraq? The country`s ethnic and sectarian divisions are just as deep and complex as Iraq`s.

Drainage crisis in Indus basin By Azhar Lashari


THE recent floods in Sindh have triggered a debate in the media about the role of the Left Bank Outfall Drain (LBOD) in exacerbating the disaster in the south-eastern districts of the province.
Much has been said and written about how the LBOD, meant for the drainage of excessive irrigation water from Nawabshah, Sanghar and Mirpurkhas districts into the Arabian Sea, has turned out to be a recurring cause of flood disaster since the 1999 cyclone in lower Sindh.
The debate focusing on the LBOD issue draws attention towards the much larger issue of `drainage crisis` engineered by international aid through man-made structural interventions in irrigation and drainage in the Indus basin — the only river basin of the country.
The portion of land drained by a river and its tributaries is the river basin. It encompasses an area of land where surface water from rain and melting snow converges on a single point called the exit of the basin, and eventually flows into an estuary, a lake, an ocean or a sea.
The Indus basin is one of the largest basins in Asia. It extends over four countries including China, India, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Around 56 per cent of the Indus basin lies in Pakistan. The British Raj introduced a modern irrigation system with perennial water supplies through mega structural measures like headworks, weirs and barrages on the rivers. Such interventions in the Indus basin commenced in 1859 with the completion of the Upper Bari Doab Canal (MBDC) from the Madhopur Headworks (now in India) on the Ravi.
However, considerable expansion of the irrigation network in the Indus basin took place in the decades following independence. That expansion was possible because of international aid (read loan).
With three storage reservoirs, two headworks, 16 barrages, 12 interlink canals, 44 canal systems, more than 64,000km of canals and 90,000 water courses in the Indus basin today, Pakistan has one of the largest contiguous irrigation systems in the world.
The huge infrastructure has made it possible to divert 101 million acre feet (MAF) out of the 154 MAF annual water flow in the Indus basin for feeding the canal system, thereby intensifying irrigation in the country. Out of a total of 52.75 million acres of cropped area, the average annual irrigated area constitutes 40 million acres. Of this, 34.5 million acres are irrigated through the canal irrigation system
But from the outset, the intensive irrigation network has unleashed a range of social and environmental problems including marginalisation of the landless and indigenous people, demographic imbalances tilted in favour of powerful political and ethnic groups, the erosion of flora and fauna, and last but not least, land degradation in the form of waterlogging and salinity.
However, the only problem that has attracted the attention of policymakers has been waterlogging and salinity. To fix the problem, structural measures like the Salinity Control and Rehabilitation Project (SCARP), Main Nara Valley Drain (MNVD), LBOD, National Drainage Programme (NDP) and the Right Bank Outfall Drain (RBOD) were undertaken. katcha nashaib pucca
The huge irrigation and drainage network developed over one and a half centuries has created an unprecedented drainage crisis in the country. The construction of storage reservoirs, barrages, weirs and other engineering works across and along the Indus rivers has seriously obstructed natural drainage in the Indus basin — both in low-lying ( or ) areas and high lands ().
The riverbeds that developed over thousands of years have been squeezed into narrow passages, not allowing peak flood flows to pass smoothly. For instance, the Indus bed previously spanned 14-20km in the plains of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, south-western Punjab and Sindh before the advent of the modern irrigation regime that saw the construction of embankments. It has now been reduced to not more than 2km. pucca
In addition, the accumulation of silt in reservoirs as well as in beds has further reduced the carrying capacity of rivers, besides increasing water velocity and intensifying bank erosion. Similarly, the development of canal and drainage infrastructure in lands has obstructed the natural drainage of streams and hill torrents that ultimately are discharged into the river basin.
For instance, the development of canals branching out from Chashma, Taunsa, Guddu and Sukkur barrages, and the RBOD have seriously complicated the drainage of hill torrents on the right bank of the Indus in southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, south-western Punjab and western Sindh.
Last year`s floods and the extraordinary torrential rain in Sindh in 2011 have revealed how the drainage crisis of the Indus basin has turned out to be a permanent flood hazard, exposing the people of the country — particularly those living in Sindh and south-western Punjab — to new risks and vulnerabilities.
As mega irrigation and drainage projects involve enormous economic costs and technical expertise, international financial institutions (IFIs) have been at the centre of efforts to promote a techno-centric approach to water development in Pakistan. They have played a role not only in complicating the drainage crisis in the Indus basin but also in incurring a heavy foreign debt.
The World Bank (WB) and Asian Development Bank (ADB) have prescribed, supported and funded many mega structures like the Tarbela Dam, Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Project, LBOD, NDP, Chotiari Dam, Taunsa Barrage, the Emergency Rehabilitation and Modernisation Project (TBERMP), etc that are socially unjust, politically exclusionary, economically exploitative and environmentally disastrous.
It is high time to find a sustainable solution to the drainage crisis in the Indus basin, besides holding WB and ADB accountable for inflicting death, disease, hunger and livelihood disruptions on hundreds of thousands people affected by last year`s floods and this year`s heavy rains in Sindh. The IFIs must be pushed to compensate the people.
The writer works for an international anti-poverty organisation.

After the SC verdict BY I.A Rehman


AS expected the Supreme Court decision on the killings and disorder in Karachi has had a mixed reception. While most commentators have welcomed the court`s directives, some have expressed disappointment that all those found responsible for heinous acts of commission and omission have not been strung up the electricity poles.
The former group includes many professional hailers of authoritative proclamations and quite a few who are happy that their political rivals have been nailed. Undeniable is the fact that what many thought was the problem in Karachi has been confirmed by the highest judicial authority. The debate will now be conducted with reference to judicially verified facts and not on the basis of the various interested parties` perceptions. This is no doubt a major gain.
Those who expected more concrete rulings perhaps do not realise that the Supreme Court must function within the parameters fixed by the law and procedure. It was not hearing a petition/appeal relating to a specific occurrence the parties to which had been duly arraigned. In the instant case, the court was acting more or less as a commission of inquiry, and its findings, in the nature of directives, should not be fruitless.
That these findings are already having a sobering effect not only on the federal and provincial governments, that are easy prey, but also on other gladiators cannot be ignored. However, the court`s major recommendations demand not only longer-term initiatives but also a firm effort to look beyond the symptoms and attack the disease at the root. hartal
Take the advice to political parties to purge themselves of criminal elements. It is easy for political parties to release lists of members deprived of offices or expelled and say that criminals have been thrown out, though their fall from grace may have been due to less noble causes. The problem arises when party cadres carry out criminal acts under orders from their bosses, such as creating disorder, burning vehicles to enforce , thrashing rivals, or collecting protection money.
Such matters demand a two-track strategy. The administration needs to rediscover its capacity to deal with crime according to the law, regardless of the identity or sociopolitical clout of the offender. At the same time, the political parties have to be persuaded to follow the elementary code of ethics.
More important than the weeding out of criminal elements is the need to get the political parties` militant wings disbanded. Democratic opinion is unlikely to support the idea of political parties being banned subject to the Supreme Court`s approval because this procedure has been abused in the past. But there can be no objection to obliging political parties to dissolve their wings/cells that are used for intimidating citizens or subjecting them to violence.
There is perhaps need to reinterpret Article 256 of the constitution, even to broaden its scope. The article says: “Private armies forbidden. No private organisation capable of functioning as a military organisation shall be formed, and any such organisation shall be illegal.”
The military organisations operating in the tribal areas, including those that are not fighting the army or are friendly to it, are obviously covered. But there is need to strengthen the laws to bring under the prohibitory provision formations that do not wear uniforms, do not carry arms all the time and do not have military-like hierarchies, but which can be used as armed bands for the furtherance of political aims through use of violence or threats of its use. bhatta
Much has been said about land grabbers and extortionists. No leniency should be shown to lawbreakers in either of these categories. But it is necessary to address the factors that cause the rise of land grabbers and collectors. It is absolutely essential to create smooth, efficient and inexpensive mechanisms for meeting the legitimate demands of the people, especially the poorer sections, such as a piece of land for living, access to utilities, reasonable guarantees of security, et al.
A large number of people need protectors and patrons because they cannot otherwise buy an airline ticket or cannot bypass the queue outside banks for paying bills, or cannot get a fine for a traffic violation waived. Something has to be done to eradicate the culture of dependence on intermediaries where none should be needed.
Nobody can possibly take exception to the direction that the police in Karachi (indeed throughout Pakistan) should be depoliticised. This does not mean only that recruitment to the police force and posting/transfer/promotion should not be done on political considerations. Difficult though this task is, it can be achieved by non-partisan superiors in service and elective offices both.
However, the fact is that even politically neutral police officers lose their way in a social milieu dominated by people who wield huge influence either because of their social status (landlords, industrial barons) or their political clout (ministers, MNAs, MPAs). These people cannot be defied by most state employees. Eventually, the police and executive officers will be truly depoliticised only when the long-delayed social reform takes place.
Likewise, the people wholeheartedly support the call for deweaponisation. All political parties also concur but there is considerable evidence of hypocrisy in their statements because most parties want only their rivals to be disarmed. Besides, deweaponisation is often understood as surrendering and confiscation of illegal weapons only.
There is a direct nexus between an increase in licensed arms and a proliferation of illicit weapons. Whenever an influential person gets a licence for a prohibited bore weapon, the outlaws in the area try to buy rockets. No deweaponisation campaign will succeed unless restrictions are placed on the grant of arms licences.
Then the question will arise of how to satisfy people who acquire arms to defend themselves because the police cannot protect them. Thus deweaponisation efforts will succeed in proportion to a visible improvement in the law-enforcement agencies` capacity to protect the people`s life and liberty. It will also be necessary to revive the old rule under which law-enforcement personnel can use only weapons and ammunition officially issued to them and they cannot use personal weapons (many of which these days could be illegal).
Finally, the Supreme Court hearings on Karachi have once again vindicated the system of suo motu proceedings, though no such vindication was necessary. One shudders to imagine what life might have been if the judiciary did not use its suo motu powers to rein in the wild ones in authority or to chastise the wayward.
At the same time, the case has underlined the axiom that such powers are most effective and beneficial if sparingly used. Perhaps in this case the people felt the outcome fell short of their expectations that had been pitched high in a climate of media hype that always does more harm than good. The honourable judges cannot be unaware of the adverse effects people`s perceptions can have on the standing of essential institutions. In this regard, too, the case may have produced a welcome result.

Movement in the making By Hina Mahmood


APPROACHING Zuccotti Park, the sound of drumbeats in the air, I could see hundreds of protesters, picketing on its lawns, a few blocks from Ground Zero in New York.
Dozens of signs read, ‘We are the 99 per cent’, as the earnest Occupy Wall Street (OWS) protesters, spoke to anyone who would listen, on issues ranging from corporate greed to education reform. The OWS movement, now in its fourth week, has gained momentum, spreading to over 25 cities. A hodgepodge of vague demands by an equally eclectic range of people projected through posters, signs, flyers, art and even music made it difficult to grasp the unifying message or theme that had brought them together.
Henry Gargan, a student from North Carolina, was hoping to encourage corporations to regulate waste and be environmentally friendly. Nicole Doula was protesting big government, favouring devolution of power to the state and community level. While Zak Cunningham, sitting beside his class warfare sign, identified himself as a communist. Despite this fragmentation, many protesters did share a sense of deepening inequality, a need for job creation and a desire for politicians to do more for the ‘other 99 per cent’.
Two factors will determine the success of the movement; frustration with the economy and the upcoming presidential race.
Frustration with the economy, Wall Street and politicians is palpable. People are furious with banks in particular: the dire state of the economy caused by irresponsible lending, the bailout by the government with taxpayer dollars and finally, the cosy relationship between politicians and Wall Street resulting in low taxes for the wealthy and light regulation.
Tom Phillips, a protester, echoed this last sentiment, “People are overeducated, underemployed, and debt-ridden.
Government has lost its way, taking care of the greedy and putting them in office. I want to show the government and Congress, to get re-elected the people will not put up with it.”
Due to a nationwide sense of inequality, high unemployment and the perception of political favour for the wealthy, the movement has spread quickly to over two dozen cities, from D.C. to Alabama to San Diego. This surge in support has caused politicians to take note. Many are referring to the OWS movement as the Tea Party for the Democrats. There are similarities.
Both movements started out with a lack of central organisation, as a backlash to Wall Street bailouts, and spread quickly nationwide. Unlike, the Tea Party at that time, the majority of OWS protesters believe that the government needs to be part of the solution.
This is where the political climate becomes interesting. With the upcoming elections and Obama’s unpopularity regarding his bailouts, the Democrats are keen to win back the support of the ‘other 99 per cent’. Obama has been eager to gain support for his ambitious job proposal, paving the way to reduce unemployment, create jobs and increase taxes on corporations and the wealthy — goals the protesters broadly share.
The Democrats are wisely tapping into OWS with House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi giving it her full endorsement on Sunday. “I support the message to the establishment, whether it’s Wall Street or the political establishment and the rest, that change has to happen,” she said. “We cannot continue in a way that does not — that is not relevant to their lives. People are angry.”
While Democrats continue to equate themselves with populist demands, they are keen to equate the Republicans with the interests of the rich and wealthy. Republicans, on their part, are not doing much to dispel this image. Mitt Romney, GOP frontrunner, described the Wall Street protests as “class warfare”. While Rick Perry, his main GOP competition, indirectly referred to the movement when he said “…you can’t rev up the engine of economic growth by heaping higher taxes on job creators, you can’t spread success by punishing it, you can’t unite our country by dividing it.…”
The ugliness between the Democrats and Republicans has begun, with Eric Cantor, House majority leader, referring to the protesters as “mobs” who have pitted “Americans against Americans”. Nancy Pelosi has retorted by accusing Cantor of being hypocritical for criticising the Wall Street protesters, while endorsing the Tea Party movement.
The fact that OWS is getting politicians riled up speaks more for the protests than the slogans pasted on their boards. The Democrats will see the movement as a way to promote their agenda of deficit reduction, job creation, and taxation on the wealthy, and as support grows, will try to bring about some coherence and unity.
As the presidential race begins next year, the Democrats may remember the House midterm elections when the Republicans rode to victory on the tail of an energised Republican base, thanks in large part to the Tea Party movement. If they are smart, they will use OWS as an antidote for the Tea Party, and perhaps, will succeed in eventually bringing it into their political fold.
The Tea Party, having gained momentum just two years ago, now finds itself in a powerful position to help Republicans defeat Obama. It is conceivable that, with OWS, the Democrats could do the same The fact that the Democrats are interested in ‘using’ OWS, is to the protesters’ advantage. Though they oppose Obama’s bailouts, they share many of his goals. OWS has won the attention of political players. The next step will be to translate demands into sound policy proposals in Congress. This will only happen if Democrats continue to stay in power. If they both ‘use’ each other effectively, it might just turn into a win-win situation.
The writer, a development economist, is currently working as a freelance journalist in New York.

THE INDEPENDENT : Robert Fisk: Democratic governments don't deal with terrorists – until they do


In three decades, the Israelis have freed 7,000 prisoners in return for 19 Israeli prisoners

Once upon a time, we lived in a world where democratic governments did no deals with "terrorists". No country promoted this nonsense more than Israel. And no Israeli leader repeated the mantra so often as one B Netanyahu Esq. After all, America never "gave way" to "terrorists". No deals would ever be done by Britain.
Indeed, if France were to release 1,000 prisoners for one French hostage – heaven forbid – Obama, La Clinton and Cameron would be loud in their fury at French cowardice. But yesterday there came not a squeak from Washington or London about Israel's latest "deal" with its supposedly "terrorist" enemies: 1,027 Palestinians for one Israeli soldier.

Of all nations on earth, Israel regularly "gives in" or does "deals" over "terrorist" demands more than any other. A quick trip down memory lane: in 1985, Israel released 1,150 prisoners for three captured Israeli soldiers in Lebanon. In 1998, for the remains of an Israeli soldier killed the previous year, Israel released 65 prisoners and the bodies of 40 dead Hezbollah men. I watched the grim procession of the latter to a south Lebanon village where the bodies reeked so badly that families were sick at the stench as they wept in mourning.
In 2004, I watched the arrogant figure of Samir Kantar – convicted of murdering a policeman and an Israeli civilian and his four-year-old daughter – stride across the Lebanese frontier from Israel a free man (along with two tractor loads of Hezbollah bodies, released in return for an Israeli agent lured into Beirut by Hezbollah). He was proclaimed a hero in Lebanon.
And so it goes on. In three decades, the Israelis have freed 7,000 prisoners in return for 19 Israeli prisoners and the remains of four dead Israeli soldiers. Quite an exchange rate. Ironically, Israel's latest "deal" – 1,027 Palestinians for one Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, captured in Gaza in 2006 – suggests that one Israeli life equals 1,300 Palestinian lives; this was almost the exact number of Palestinians killed in Gaza in the 2008-09 invasion when 13 Israelis were killed.
Oddly, Israel never explained – and most journalists never asked – why its soldiers simply could not discover where Shalit was held in Gaza. It must have been Israeli military incompetence on a massive scale – unless the missing soldier was taken briefly through the Gaza tunnels to Egypt. Perhaps, when he is released, he will tell us.
In the past 30 years, the hostage swaps have been engineered by the International Red Cross, the German intelligence service, the United Nations and now the Egyptians. Hamas, crowing as usual at its "success", might choose to hold its tongue. Arrangements currently suggest that in return for Shalit they will receive 500 Palestinians now and 527 Palestinians "later". More than 10 years ago, the UN engineered a similar swap. Half the Lebanese prisoners came home during the hostage swap; then the Israelis decided to keep the other half.
The UN's special negotiator told me personally that when he pointed this out to then-UN Secretary General, the latter said of the remaining prisoners: "Forget them." No doubt Hamas can be equally as ruthless. Since they are now trying to force journalists and others to obtain "visas" before visiting their Republic of Gaza, we may not know.
In any case, it's a dirty and outrageous business, doing deals with "terrorists". Do not utter the word hypocrisy. And don't expect Obama to say a word. After all, the poor man is seeking re-election.
Source: http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-democratic-governments-dont-deal-with-terrorists-ndash-until-they-do-2369660.html