Showing posts with label War on Terror. Show all posts
Showing posts with label War on Terror. Show all posts

Saturday, 15 October 2011

Some suggest staying away from Obama’s Wars By Imran Ali Teepu


ISLAMABAD: Gazetted officers of the federal government receive a book from the Cabinet Division’s Services Club every  year – for a price – to stimulate their minds.
Last year, ‘The Idea of Justice’ by Nobel laureate Amartya Sen was chosen for them and was well received. In the book the eminent Indian economist argues that a “theory of justice that can serve as the basis of practical reasoning must include ways of judging how to reduce injustice and advance justice, rather than aiming only at the characterisation of perfectly just societies”.
But some recipients are disturbed over this year’s choice of Bob Woodward’s ‘Obama’s Wars’. They find the “criticism” of President Asif Ali Zardari in it disturbing, more so when the book has been distributed through the Army’s Services Book Club (ASBC).
Both the presidential and military spokesmen sounded non-committal in their comments to Dawn on the distribution of the book by ASBC.
“ASBC routinely sends books to civilian officers,” said Maj Gen Athar Abbas of the ISPR. But he was “not aware” that this year the ASBC had sent them Obama’s Wars.
Presidential spokesman Farhatullah Babar was equally unaware but more dismissive. “Since I am not aware about this (distribution) I have no comments to offer,” he said.
Bob Woodward, a Washington Post journalist, writes in the book that President Zardari told the then-CIA Director Gen Michael Hayden during their meeting in New York on 12 November 2008: “Kill the seniors. Collateral damage (caused by CIA drone attacks inside Pakistan) worries you Americans. It does not worry me.”
That unattributed account of the meeting irritated Islamabad and was immediately rejected by Pakistani ambassador in Washington, Hussain Haqqani. “I am amazed that the book was purchased in bulk and distributed to civilian officials,” said a senior federal bureaucrat. His colleague concurred that Obama’s Wars should not have been a choice read because its narrative reflect’s Washington’s “paranoia like mistrust” of Pakistan.
However, there are bureaucrats who say that “anything revealing the inner thoughts of other governments about Pakistan must be read by us”.
“It was President Gen Ziaul Haq who made book reading a must in the bureaucracy. Every federal government officer of Grade 17 and above had to become a member of the ASBC,” recalled a former bureaucrat.
The missionary president, however, chose mainly religious books, including Maulana Abul Aala Maudoodi’s voluminous Tafheem-ul-Quran. After him the titles changed and books on worldly matters by international writers also found their way through ASBC, he said.
ASBC distributes the book chosen for the officers at nominal price which is deducted from their salary.

Friday, 14 October 2011

Petraeus tells CIA analysts to heed troops on war


WASHINGTON (AP) — David Petraeus, the former general who led the Afghanistan war and now heads the CIA, has ordered hisintelligence analysts to give greater weight to the opinions of troops in the fight, U.S. officials said.
CIA analysts now will consult with battlefield commanders earlier in the process as they help create elements of a National Intelligence Estimate on the course of the war, to more fully include the military's take on the conflict, U.S. officials say.
Their input could improve the upcoming report card for the war.
The most recent U.S. intelligence assessment offered a dim view of progress in Afghanistan despite the counterinsurgency campaign Petraeus oversaw there and painted a stark contrast to the generally upbeat predictions of progress from Petraeus and other military leaders. Petraeus has made no secret of his frustration with recent negative assessments coming primarily from the CIA, and said during his confirmation hearing that he planned to change the way the civilian analysts grade wars.
The CIA's analysis makes up the bulk of national intelligence estimates, which help guide the White House and Congress in drafting future policy.
The CIA says Petraeus' tweaks to the agency's part of the assessment will add to its accuracy, not tilt the results, and that military commanders' views were always part of the equation.
"Analytic debate and discussion haven't been chilled; they've been promoted," CIA spokeswoman Jennifer Youngblood said.
The change has been backed by National Intelligence Director James Clapper, another senior U.S. official said.
The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because the intelligence assessment is classified.
Petraeus took over as head of the CIA last month. He was directly in charge of the war in Afghanistan for more than a year — his last job in uniform — and oversaw the war as the head of Central Command before that. Like Iraq, Afghanistan has become a proving ground for the theories of counterinsurgency Petraeus is credited with making central to current U.S. military doctrine.
The previous U.S. intelligence assessment on Afghanistan and Pakistan earlier this year contradicted then-war-commander Petraeus' assessment. Where he saw "fragile but reversible progress," the analysts from across the intelligence community largely reported stalemate in several parts of the country. The disagreements were highlighted in the CIA's district by district assessments in which progress was graded geographically, with intelligence analysts seeing far less progress in key districts than did military commanders on the ground.
They emphasized a spate of assassinations by the Taliban and poor performance by the Afghan government in their report, two U.S. officials say.
Analysts also were negative about the performance of the Afghanistan security forces, whereas military commanders saw some units performing competently.
After taking the top spy job, Petraeus dispatched a top CIA official to the Afghan war zone to interview both sides to try to reconcile their differing opinions. Petraeus together with his staff concluded that those lower-level commanders on the battlefield needed to have input into the CIA process, two U.S. officials said.
In the previous process of assessing Afghan districts — which becomes a key building block of national intelligence estimates — analysts only sent their work to the top military commander, toward the end of the process. Now they'll share their conclusions with lower-level officers earlier to give them the opportunity to assess the intelligence analysts' conclusions and offer dissenting opinions, two officials said.
That process of including the field commanders first was actually started by then-Gen. Petraeus, who asked that his regional commanders review the draft CIA assessments before he did, one senior official said. Marine Gen. John Allen, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan now, has now made the same request, the official said.
Critics of the change say allowing the military more pushback will have a chilling effect on the analysts' ability to give the war a failing grade, a senior intelligence official said.
One intelligence official expressed concern that this would institutionalize the former general's habit when in Afghanistan of challenging the CIA's unflattering conclusions, the official said.
Senior U.S. officials insist the military will not be able to change the CIA's analysis but only add comments if they dissent from it. How those comments will be reflected has not yet been determined.
Petraeus insisted at his confirmation hearing in June that he could "grade my own work." But he vowed then to change the way the CIA grades wars, saying the analysts relied on battlefield data that was often six weeks to eight weeks old. He called that a snapshot that was outdated by the time it reached decision-makers.
Petraeus earlier told senators he'd disagreed with four such national intelligence estimates on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan __ two because he thought they were too pessimistic, and two he thought were too optimistic.
Tweaking the way data is collected and analyzed is not new for Petraeus, said one U.S. military official who worked as a troubleshooter for the general in Afghanistan.
Petraeus had been equally demanding of commanders in the field, asking them to constantly grade their district's progress, and had been working to revamp the reporting process there as well, the official said, speaking on condition of anonymity to describe the military intelligence collection process.
Petraeus would ask field commanders to assess everything from how secure the area was to whether the Afghan government was providing people adequate services, but his troubleshooting team had found there was no uniform scale within the military to compare progress district by district. The troubleshooters concluded that commanders making the calls were often less than well-versed in judging non-military measures of progress such as the integrity of local government, so the assessment was often based on the commander's personal opinions.
That was something Petraeus was working to fix when he left, the official said.
The February Afghan intelligence assessment found that special operations night raids, combined with village-by-village security operations, had shown more lasting progress in undermining the Taliban and their influence than attempts by conventional military forces to drive out militants, according to three U.S. officials who have read the analysis and described it to The Associated Press.
Petraeus oversaw both the conventional and special operations military campaigns, but his ideas about how to outsmart insurgent militias are more closely associated with the conventional military.
The report did not favor one strategy over another. But the information gave ammunition to those who supported Vice President Joe Biden's special operations-centered counterterrorism strategy over Petraeus' backing of traditional counterinsurgency. It was seen as proof for some that the additional conventional forces Petraeus championed made little impact on the overall campaign and a slam against parts of the strategy designed by its architect just as he seeks to lead the intelligence service.
President Barack Obama's announcement of a drawdown of 33,000 troops is being seen as another departure from Petraeus' counterinsurgency strategy.
Petraeus would only say it was a more "aggressive ... timeline" than he'd recommended, which meant greater risk that U.S. forces might not succeed.
In at least one instance, the analysts' conclusions in that last intelligence assessment tracked with Petraeus' recommendation of keeping larger numbers of troops on the ground for a longer time period.
The intelligence analysts pointed to intercepted communications and broadcasts among Taliban commanders who were heartened by Obama's drawdown timetable and were able to reverse their decline of last spring in recruiting new fighters, two U.S. officials said.
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Kimberly Dozier can be followed on Twitter via (at)kimberlydozier
Source: http://news.yahoo.com/petraeus-tells-cia-analysts-heed-troops-war-073021045.html;_ylt=Aq4Z8alHx0v4csmStYaThkys0NUE;_ylu=X3oDMTNhNHFvODhzBG1pdAMEcGtnA2EwZWU2OGQyLWFiNTEtMzM4NC05MzIwLTQxMWIwMWIwZTEwMgRwb3MDNQRzZWMDbG5fQVBfZ2FsBHZlcgNiYTczNjEwMC1mNjM4LTExZTAtYmZkYy1jZDU3Y2U3Yjc5NzI-;_ylv=3

Wednesday, 12 October 2011

US ‘fighting a war’ in Pakistan: Panetta


WASHINGTON: Defence Secretary Leon Panetta said Tuesday the United States is waging “war” in Pakistan against militants, referring to a covert campaign the CIA steadfastly refuses to publicly confirm.
It was Panetta’s latest comment acknowledging drone bombing raids in Pakistan, an open secret that the US government declines to discuss publicly.
Speaking to an audience at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, the former CIA director pointed to a “complicated relationship” between Washington and Islamabad.
“And admittedly, there are a lot of reasons for that. We are fighting a war in their country,” Panetta said.
“They have in fact given us cooperation in the operations of trying to confront Al-Qaeda in (tribal areas)… And they continue to work with us.”
But he said the two countries had sharp disagreements over “the relations they maintain with some of the militant groups in that country”, a reference to Washington’s demand that Islamabad crack down on the Haqqani network.
During a visit to US bases in Italy last week, Panetta made two casual references to the CIA’s use of armed drones.
“Having moved from the CIA to the Pentagon, obviously I have a hell of a lot more weapons available to me in this job than I did at CIA — although Predators aren’t bad,” Panetta told an audience of sailors at the US Navy’s Sixth Fleet headquarters in Naples.
Bombing raids by robotic unmanned US aircraft dramatically increased under President Barack Obama, with the CIA operation focusing on Al-Qaeda and Taliban figures in northwest Pakistan.
About 30 drone strikes have been reported in Pakistan since elite US Special Operations Forces killed Al-Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden in May near the country’s main military academy in Abbottabad, close to the capital.
US officials did not notify Pakistan in advance of the raid, and Panetta — the CIA chief at the time — subsequently said the US government feared that bin Laden would be tipped off about the operation beforehand.
An American drone is also believed to have killed US-born Al-Qaeda cleric Anwar al-Awlaqi in Yemen last month.

Tuesday, 11 October 2011


WAR has raged between the Pakistani Army and Taliban forces for several years now, spilling over from the tribal areas and Swat into the plains and cities of Pakistan.
As a result, Peshawar, Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi have all borne the brunt of attacks on security targets, with Pakistan’s children being the most affected by the conflict.
Karachi-based psychologist Ishma Alvi explains the psychological effects of the war on terror and related violence on Karachi’s children. “There has been a marked increase in anxiety disorders, especially generalised anxiety disorder as well as agoraphobia, the fear of going to spaces where the sufferer might feel threatened, where there appears to be little escape and
where one might have a panic attack.”
She notes an increase in major depressive disorder, or clinical depression. “Not only have these disorders been appearing more frequently, they have been presenting in younger groups — teenagers to young adults.”
With 48 per cent of Pakistan’s population under the age of 18, and a small percentage of the budget allocated for education, chances are that extremism will continue to foment in the minds of young people faced with limited employment opportunities. According to Sharmeen Obaid-Chinoy, director of the Emmy-winning documentary Children of the Taliban, economic deprivation ensures that they will continue to turn to terrorism as a way of ensuring survival for their families.
Mindful of this ongoing threat, the Pakistan Army, during their 2009 operation in Swat, removed dozens of teenage boys who had been trained as suicide bombers from Taliban training camps. It enlisted Dr Feriha Peracha, a popular psychologist with a lucrative private practice in Lahore, to assess 12 of these boys. It was then proposed that she run a school aimed at rehabilitating them, and Dr Peracha agreed. Thirty-five children and teenagers were enrolled in this school, called Sabaoon, the Pushto word for the first ray of light in the morning.
The school was heavily guarded, and remotely located — security a top priority for such a delicate operation. The programme was administered by Dr Peracha’s organisation, the Unicef-funded Hum Pakistani Foundation. The programme included mainstream academic intervention and vocational training “for those who are unable to keep up with academics but continue with education at their own individual levels of achievement, starting with basic literacy”, says Dr Peracha.
Classroom education was supplemented with nature expeditions, art and drawing sessions and time to play sports, in order to give the boys a taste of the childhood that was snatched from them during the Taliban occupation of their villages and towns and their time in the training camps.
Religious academic and Swat University vice chancellor Dr Mohammed Farooq Khan visited the school once a week to teach the boys an Islam free from the distortions the Taliban had taught them. Undoing the damage inflicted upon the boys’ psyches — the five-point programme of indoctrination — was going to take months, if not years.
Rather than interrogating them or laying blame for their willingness to kill in the name of God, Dr Khan treated them as children who had undergone major psychological trauma, and attempted to educate and counsel them, helping them to understand how the Taliban had distorted their perceptions of religion and the West.
Sabaoon received media attention for its groundbreaking efforts and seemed to be off to a good start. Even the most severely indoctrinated children had begun to understand that the version of Islam previously taught to them was an ideology that encouraged death and destruction in their once peaceful valley. Then, one day in October 2009, the Taliban came to Dr Khan’s clinic and shot him in the head as he ate lunch with his assistant.
The murder has been linked to the ideological changes that Dr Khan had been attempting to institute in Swat University, which had become a hotbed of religious extremism during the days of the Taliban invasion of Swat, but his death had direct repercussions for Sabaoon and the boys in the school’s care.
“He was with me just two days before at the school,” says Dr Peracha, “and I had given some books to him about empathy training and requested him to use the parables and other narratives from the Quran to teach the same concept to the boys….”
Dr Peracha acknowledges the vacuum created by Dr Khan’s death, but it has not deterred her from her mission. She has hired another expert religious scholar as well as regular Islamic studies teachers to continue the work of Dr Khan, as she feels that the combination of religious education and psycho-social intervention is key to saving her charges from a path that no child should ever have to tread.
While danger continues to be a constant companion for Pakistan and its people, the key to surviving its psychological onslaught is to cultivate a place of safety within. Ishma Alvi urges parents to talk honestly to their children about the events and circumstances around them. She adds that parents must endeavour to keep calm in the moments of crisis that regularly erupt in Karachi and elsewhere in Pakistan’s restive cities. “That doesn’t mean they should fake calm, but that they should maintain calm despite fear.”
So many Pakistanis born in the age of the war on terror have died in these 10 years that it’s easy to imagine Pakistan as haunted by the children who never made it through the decade between Sept 11, 2001 and the death of Osama bin Laden in May 2011. But after the ones that have died, including the 160 children the UK-based Bureau for Investigative Journalism claims have been killed in US drone strikes since 2004, it’s the children who lived through and still live within the conflict areas that are the hardest-hit victims of the war and its violent blowback throughout Pakistan.