Dawn Analysis: The selfish state by Cyril Almeida

CRISES erupt, the government fire-fights, things settle back down: we’ve seen it a million times before, right?
At least that’s what logic traced on the historical record suggests. It’s always been the same, always will be the same. The unofficial motto of Pakistan is, onwards to the next crisis.
And yet, it’s hard to shake off the feeling that maybe, just maybe, something different is afoot.
The possibility of an Arab Spring breaking out in Pakistan has been pooh-poohed: Pakistanis are reasonably adept at knocking out of power dictators and civilians alike.
If you want Zardari out, a crowd of 10,000 converging on Constitution Avenue will have him scrambling to catch the next flight to Dubai. If you want Kayani gone, it would be more complicated and messier, but not as titanic as toppling a Mubarak or Qadhafi.
The possibility of an electoral revolution has been downplayed: the latest would-be saviour, Imran Khan, looks set to grab some seats, but lacks the candidates and party apparatus to make sweeping gains. The status-quo political powers will prevail come election time, or at least so says conventional wisdom.
The possibility of an Islamist takeover has been dismissed: the state is still too strong, the army too numerous for it to crumble against a militant force that all told may be a few tens of thousands strong.
The possibility of an Iran-style clergy-led revolution appears to be remote: among the ideologues in the religious parties and the militant corps none has the broad-based charismatic appeal that can carry them to national power.
But what do we really know about the preferences of the Pakistani people?
Conventional wisdom has it that the people want democracy to continue, they don’t want the army back. But the last time that theory was tested, a mere 35 million people turned out to vote in 2008. What did the other 130 million want?
Remove kids aged 14 and below from the scope of political action, and you’re still left with 80-odd million people whose opinion we know little about. Are they just indifferent to democracy, at least Pakistan’s version of it, or are they a combustible
mixture waiting for the right catalyst to be poured on?
The PPP and the PML-N are Pakistan’s two most popular political parties. Power will always belong to one of them, so says conventional wisdom again.
Turn once more to the 2008 elections and you’ll see that the PPP got ten and a half million votes, the PML-N nearly eight million. That’s a whole bunch more than zero — which our latest populist got after opting out of the election — and the handful
that the mullah brigade picked up.
Still, the notion that Pakistani politics is about constituency, constituency, constituency is undercut by the results of the last two elections. In ’08, the electorate singled out Musharraf’s men for punishment; in ’02, the American arrival in Afghanistan
powered the MMA to wins in Balochistan and then-NWFP.
With the right message, and the right timing, a few millions votes could be bagged, enough to bestow the sparkling newcomer with kingmaker status in the next parliament.
And it doesn’t necessarily have to be a politician as we know them. A right-wing ideologue could ride the wave of crazed religiosity that a Mumtaz Qadri-type act can unleash. Or maybe the next Lal Masjid-style firebrand will decide that the
possibility of a temporal kingdom is more tempting than certain rewards in the hereafter.
The surge doesn’t even have to come through the ballot box. Thus far the Baitullahs and Hakeemullahs and Faqir Mohammads have, much to the luck of the rest of us, thought small not big.
They have just wanted their little fiefdoms, their small platoons of suicide bombers, a bite here, a morsel there. And they haven’t exactly been the sharpest pencils in the militant box. Fear the day one of those kookie guys marries grand ambition to
ruthless political skill.
And why must it come from the civilian corner?
The army rank and file is disciplined and won’t en masse act on any crazy ideas, says conventional wisdom. But what about the top? It’s pretty well established that some pretty nutty men have made their way into the inner circle in the past.As for the
rank and filers tucked away in their orderly cantonments, who’s to say what they’re really thinking about and talking over among themselves. Rural and urban Pakistan have not stood still over the last 30 years, so why must the products of those
societies be what they have always been, docile and disciplined?
Whether any of these possibilities — or other possibilities that haven’t really been thought about — will ever come to pass is impossible to predict.
Easier is to identify the core reason for the unease spreading about the future of this country: the state has become its own raison d’être. The Pakistani state no longer exists to try and improve the lives of the people who live within it; it exists to feed
and perpetuate itself.
Really, what policy of the army hews to the public’s demand, recorded in poll after poll, election after election, for better delivery of basic services, for jobs, for economic well-being? Security or prosperity is a false choice, manifold times so when
the policy of putting security first has made Pakistan one of the least secure countries in the world.
And what’s the point of a transition to democracy when the choices made by a civilian set-up simply nudge the country a little closer to the edge of a cliff?
When a state exists to tend to its own needs to the almost-total exclusion of the public’s dreams and aspirations, it will eventually become a nightmare for everyone involved.
The only thing we don’t know yet: what kind of nightmare exactly.


Source: http://www.dawn.com/2011/10/14/the-selfish-state.html

The pact of Hudaibya By Nilofar Ahmed

SOME time after the migration of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) and his followers to Madina, the Makkans banned the entry of the believers in Makkah, even for the purposes of Haj or umrah. The Muslims yearned to visit the Kaaba to perform the pilgrimage. After about six years, the Prophet and some 1,500 of his companions started out for Makkah on Ziqa’ad 1, 6 AH, (628 CE), with the intention of performing umrah. They put on the ihram, recited the intention and thus entered the state of consecration.

They did not carry any weapons but the Makkans came to know of their approach and decided to block their path, even if it meant having to go to war. The Prophet decided to avoid confrontation and bloodshed, and to take a very rough and circuitous route. The Muslims camped at Hudaibya, located on the border of Makkah. They decided to negotiate with the Makkans to allow them the peaceful practice of their religion. The Makkans sent small gangs to attack the believers so that they would be incited to start a war. Otherwise they wanted them to turn back. The Prophet dealt with them with great patience and released the Makkans each time after arresting them. The Prophet sent Hazrat Usman as his envoy to the Makkans to convince them to send Suhail bin Umro to talk to him. After negotiations, the final pact, whose scribe was Hazrat Ali, was agreed upon and came to be known as the Sulah Hudaibya (the peace pact of Hudaibya). Some of its clauses were as follows: there would be peace for 10 years in which both parties would refrain from fighting; when a believer came to Makkah and Taif for the purposes of pilgrimage or trade, his life would be protected; if any Qureishi passed through the Muslim territory of Madina, his life would also be protected. The most difficult point to accept was that of one-sided extradition, and which stated that if a Qureishi who had converted to Islam was to escape from his guardian and reach the Prophet in Madina, he would be forced to go back, but if a Muslim renounced his faith and escaped to Makkah, the Makkans would not be obliged to return him.Besides these points, it was also declared that both parties would remain true to the pact; that they would not commit treachery and remain neutral in their wars with other parties; that the Bedouin tribes would be free to make friends with whichever party they pleased; that sacrificial animals would be sacrificed in Hudaibyah and not brought to Makkah; that rights and duties of both parties would be equal. It was also agreed that Muslims would return to Madina without performing umrah that year; that they would be allowed to come back the next year to perform the pilgrimage and be allowed to remain in Makkah for three days; that they would carry only a traveller’s weapon, and not weapons of war; that the Makkans would leave the city for those three days; and that when the Muslims returned, they would not be allowed to take anyone along with them. In this pact, the Prophet, through his wisdom, was able to keep the higher, far-reaching goals in mind. Some of his companions were outraged and found the accord degrading. They resisted coming out of ihram. The Prophet consulted his wife, Umme Salma. She advised him to go ahead and perform the acts needed to come out of the state of ihram himself. He followed her advice. As soon as his companions saw that, they followed suit.The Prophet was always true to his word. While still at Hudaibya, he encountered a difficult decision. Abu Jandal, a new convert, broke his fetters and came crying to him asking that he be rescued from the Makkans who were torturing him. Seeing his condition all the companions were enraged. But the Prophet kept his word and offered him no help, except taking a promise from Abu Jandal’s father that he would not be tortured. On their return to Madina, Muslims met Abu Busair, another new convert who had escaped from Makkah. His relatives demanded his return and the Prophet complied. Abu Busair later managed to escape again, hid in a gorge near Badar and kept attacking the caravans of the Makkans going to Syria.

Many other converts joined him and made it impossible for the caravans to pass that way. Frustrated, the Makkans themselves approached the Prophet to cancel the clause of one-sided extradition. The converts were now able to join the believers in Madina. While on his way back from Hudaibya, the Prophet received the revelation of the first verses of Surah Al-Fatah, in which Allah declared this pact to be a victory (48: 1). The companions later realised that the pact had had far-reaching, beneficial effects. That the Makkans signed an agreement with the Prophet showed that they had accepted him as the legitimate leader of a people and a state. Thus, through his wisdom, patience and farsightedness, the Prophet commanded respect, established his moral authority and brought about a peaceful settlement between people of different faiths through non-violence and sincere negotiations. n

The writer is a scholar of the Quran and writes on its relevance to contemporary issues.

Source: http://www.dawn.com/2011/10/14/the-pact-of-hudaibya.html

IMP: Democracy’s failure? By S. Akbar Zaidi

THE new conventional wisdom is that democracy has failed in Pakistan. Yet again. It seems so obvious to everyone that this is now the overwhelming, unquestioned, uncontested consensus. Even very honourable and well-meaning members of the National Assembly, the main beneficiaries of democracy, have announced its failure.

Some concerned citizens and analysts have, as always, asked the military to intervene, yet again, while others have suggested that this would have happened many months ago, but that it is the military which is reluctant to take on such a huge mess supposedly created by elected representatives. The list of democracy`s failures is extensive and impressive.

The economy is usually at the top of the list to accentuate democracy`s failure. Pakistan`s economy is said to be in a crisis since the day the PPP government has been in power. Everyone who knows absolutely nothing about how the economy functions has an opinion on it, arguing that it has hit `rock bottom`, it is facing its `worst crisis` ever, and other such colourful, descriptive terms.

But, the broad consensus is that the economy has collapsed completely. Lawlessness and growing ghunda gardi at the local level is another manifestation of the failure of democracy as is always Karachi`s ethnic and political strife. One cannot mention democracy and not mention corruption, of course, for it is assumed that democracy in Pakistan is a system which is just another name for corruption.

The fact that the rupee has fallen some 30 per cent is also democracy`s failing, and of course, the power crisis, for which only democracy must be held responsible. Baloch separatism? Of course, due to democracy`s failure. Militancy, and `religion-based enthusiasm`? These have to be democracy`s biggest failures. How could one disagree? This is just the very top of a list which runs very deep. This ability of democracy to do such extensive damage to the economy, society, even to politics must surely be the envy of every other system known to society.

Yet blaming everything that has gone wrong with Pakistan on democracy only emphasises the fact that those who do so fail to understand what democracy is supposed to be, what purpose it serves and, importantly, how one evaluates successes and failures.

It also reveals a complete absence of a reading of how history has affected, and continues to affect and burden, the present, and amnesia about the past. Or, how social forces and social structures influence, even determine, current outcomes and a host of other social phenomena which have a bearing on social and political relationships.

The expectations from democracy in Pakistan have been highly and unrealistically exaggerated. To expect that democracy is a solution to any of Pakistan`s economic or social problems, or a counter to militancy and `religion-based enthusiasm`, is to misunderstand what it is that democracy ought to deliver.

More importantly, it is to be completely unaware of the structural and social conditions which constitute Pakistani democracy: messy, compromised, reconciliatory, inefficient, just like the rest of society, and which explain so many of Pakistan`s recurrent failures. To expect Pakistani democracy to be some angel-like, ideal, pristine system of government is foolish. Pakistani democracy only reflects what Pakistani society is.

For a country which has only known either military rule or electoral politics dominated by the military in the last 35 years to suddenly expect democracy to `succeed`, without any historical precedence, is equally absurd. Importantly, one needs to compare similar forms of representation from the past to evaluate the current form of governance rather than some abstract notions of democracy.

There is no denying the fact that the current government has been an abject failure in addressing many of the issues mentioned above. However, to hold democracy responsible for this failure is to confuse form with content. It is the government which fails, not necessarily the system which brought it to power.

Also, if one considers previous manifestations of representative and electoral government in Pakistan, the 1990s for example, despite its assumed failures most people would still consider today`s elected form of representation far better than the miserable 1990s. Democratic traditions, practices and outcomes evolve over time. By all accounts, Pakistan`s democratic system, while still starkly inefficient, has noticeably improved over the last two decades. All those writing about the `failure of democracy` in Pakistan must recognise this fact.

If one examines any of the supposed failures of democracy outlined above in a historical spectrum, we will learn that many of the problems which have exacerbated now have deeper roots. Pakistan`s economy, while not in a crisis, is in a mess because of the absence of policies and neglect not just of this government, but very much so of at least the two that preceded it.

The power crisis is not new either. Even critics of this government date it to 2006 or 2007. Clearly, neither democracy nor this government was to blame for this. Militancy and `religion-based enthusiasm`? Surely, a more objective and honest assessment to locate their genesis in a previous era is needed. There is no doubt that this government has made things far worse, but can one really call this democracy`s failures?

When people talk about the failure of democracy, they ought to mean that the government has failed their expectations. Whether their expectations were realistic and such that could be met by any form of government is never questioned. Democracy is not a solution to problems; it only allows us greater freedoms to recognise and articulate them. It also allows us to vote out those governments which have failed.

The writer is a political economist.

Source: http://www.dawn.com/2011/10/14/democracys-failure.html

Cricket Australia slams “outlandish” match-fixing allegations

MELBOURNE: Cricket Australia chief executive James Sutherland says claims made in a London court over Australian match-fixing are ”outlandish and made by a person of dubious repute.”

On Monday, the player agent at the centre of the Pakistan spot-fixing allegations, Mazhar Majeed, named in recordings played in court several high-profile ex-Pakistan internationals as well as unnamed Australians as being involved in corruption.

Sutherland said Tuesday that ”these sweeping statements unfairly malign Australian cricketers,” but if there was any evidence of wrongdoing, Australian officials would investigate.

”These would appear to be baseless allegations,” Sutherland added, saying that he would have been made aware by the International Cricket Council if Australians were involved in any match-fixing.

The recordings were made by the prosecution’s chief witness Mazhar Mahmood, the undercover journalist who was working for the now-defunct British tabloid The News of the World. The recordings were played at London’s Southwark crown court on the fourth day of the trial.

Majeed accused Australian players of being the ”biggest” match-fixers in world cricket, although he never backed his claim up with any evidence.

Majeed told Mahmood that Australian players would fix ”brackets,” a set period of a match on which gamblers bet, for example, on how many runs will be scored.

”The Australians, they are the biggest, they have 10 brackets a game,” Majeed said on the tape played to the court.

Sutherland said Tuesday that the ICC attends all international matches with its corruption unit and “there is nothing I have heard to suggest that there are Australian players who are of interest to them”.

“If there is any issue or there is any concern, we will investigate them”, Sutherland added. ”If we charge players and we find them guilty we will have no qualms about issuing a life sentence on players who are found guilty of match-fixing.”

Australian Cricketers’ Association chief executive Paul Marsh said Majeed was unreliable and his evidence should be considered in context.

”I don’t think he’s got a lot of credibility,” Marsh told Australian Broadcasting Corp. radio. ”I found it very interesting that he was prepared to name the names of some Pakistani players but no Australian players.

”Our players are paid very well, they’re educated very well, and I think our guys understand the consequences of getting involved here in this space. It’s just not in the Australian culture.”

In London, former Pakistan captain Salman Butt and fast bowler Mohammed Asif are facing charges of conspiracy to cheat, and conspiracy to obtain and accept corrupt payments.

Butt, Asif and Pakistan teammate Mohammed Amir are accused of conspiring with Majeed to bowl deliberate no-balls in the fourth test against England at Lord’s in August of last year.

Butt and Asif deny the charges. Majeed and Amir are not required to appear in court.

Source: http://www.dawn.com/2011/10/11/cricket-australia-slams-%E2%80%9Coutlandish%E2%80%9D-match-fixing-allegations.html

A different paradigm by Kaiser Bengali

THE 18th Amendment and the seventh NFC Award have now placed responsibility for development in the provincial domain. However, the provinces appear to be unprepared to shoulder the responsibility.

Provincial development planning is limited to putting together a disparate collection of schemes. There is little in terms of determining the relationship of one scheme to another. Resultantly, there is no overall direction to the development process. There is, thus, an abject need to introduce formal planning processes at the provincial level.

While institutionalising the planning process and upgrading capacity is an absolute necessity, it will not be sufficient to achieve the goal of socioeconomic development. This is because, unlike in the first half of the period since independence, the institutional capacity of state agencies has deteriorated to the point where it is no longer fully capable of enforcing its writ in terms of implementing projects efficiently. A decline in technical capacity and a steep rise in corruption at almost every level of government bureaucracy are two main internal factors in the weakening of the government`s institutional capacity.

The first half of the country`s life saw the planning and efficient execution of such large and complex projects as the Indus River replacement works, the Karakoram and Indus highways, Port Qasim, the Steel Mills, heavy electrical and mechanical complexes, and so on. Now, there are hardly any schemes that are completed on time or within the original cost estimate or that last till their stipulated life without major repairs and rehabilitation.

In fact, a major portion of Sindh`s annual development plan comprises rehabilitation schemes. One project in Karachi that collapsed within a month of its inauguration aptly illustrates the level of institutional decay of the public sector`s implementation capacity. With regard to social services, public facilities are in a woeful state and needs no elaboration.

A case can be made for strengthening the capacity of the public sector to deliver. Unfortunately, the malaise is too deep and the deterioration has passed the point of no return. Development and the needs of the people cannot await the luxury of public-sector reform. While there is a cadre of highly competent and committed public servants, the majority is mediocre and a minority — mercifully, microscopic — is incompetent, petty-minded, manipulative and corrupt. Unfortunately, the latter has tended to dominate over the years.

At the other end of the spectrum, the mantra of the neoliberal lobby is one of outright privatisation. However, privatisation too has failed to deliver. Zeal Pak Cement and KESC are two of the many examples of mindless privatisation that has seriously damaged the public interest.

There are two reasons for the failure of the private sector. One, the Pakistani private sector is inherently weak and has failed to graduate from the status of a trading class to the level of entrepreneurship. As such, it cannot survive in a competitive environment. It has routinely claimed the absence of an enabling investment environment within the country, but has failed to make its mark abroad, even where a congenial enabling environment is available; for example, the UAE, where Indian businesses dominate

The second reason is more fundamental. The very objective of socioeconomic development is to enable those bereft of income-earning endowments to acquire the same. However, the market does not, by definition, respond to need; it responds to purchasing power. It responds to the needs of the rich and ignores the needs of the poor. The resultant inequality in the distribution of income and wealth is politically and morally unacceptable.

A third stakeholder that has emerged in the development arena is civil society organisations. Many of them have recorded remarkable successes in the provision of education, health and other social services efficiently, in terms of quality as well as cost. However, a limitation of civil society organisations is their inability to go to scale.

Given the relative weaknesses of the public and private sectors and civil society organisations, it is advisable to harness the relative strengths of all three. In this respect, the traditional divide between public versus private sector-centred development strategies is now irrelevant. Ideology has to give way to pragmatism. The demands of socioeconomic development are too large and too urgent for any one section of society to meet in isolation from other stakeholders. The goal of socioeconomic development calls for a complete reorientation of the paradigm for executing development plans. The government needs to recognise that, while keeping ownership in the public domain, implementation or management can be contracted out either to a private party or to a civil society organisation — wherever feasible. If not in their entirety, schemes or functions can be unbundled and specific parts contracted out. Of course, the implementation or management contract needs to include specified performance standards, capable of being subjected to a performance audit.

There is an urgent imperative to pool the resources of the public sector, the private sector and civil society. The new paradigm has to be one of partnering between government, private sector and civil society: partnering with the private sector for the execution of infrastructure projects and with civil society organisations for the delivery of social services. Public-private partnership is not a new concept, but has been applied sparingly. It is now necessary to adopt it as a primary approach to development.

Sindh has taken the first steps in this direction, realising the enormity of the developmental challenges and the resource and institutional capacity constraints facing the province. Its first venture under the PPP regime is the 60km, four-lane international standard Hyderabad-Mirpurkhas highway, scheduled to be completed on time and within the stipulated cost in early 2012. The highway, being built by a private company, will be `owned` and maintained by it for 30 years. The Sindh government`s share in the cost of the highway is 30 per cent, as a soft loan to the company.

The upshot of this arrangement is that, if as a result of partnering, the government has to put in, say, one-third of the cost, it will be able to undertake three projects for the same amount of money that it would have to devote to one project. And quality product and escape from cost overruns and delays are added benefits.

Further, realising the continuing inability of government departments to deliver basic health services efficiently, the Sindh government set up the Public Private Health Initiative, and handed over the management of over 1,000 Basic Health Units (BHUs) to it. These BHUs are now actually served by doctors, including women doctors, and stocked with necessary quality medicines in premises that are clean and well maintained and providing quality primary medical care to millions among the rural population.

The two successful cases outlined above point to adopting partnering as the new paradigm for executing development projects and delivering social services. Needless to say, there is opposition to the partnership paradigm from vested interests. However, there is a need to formally adopt and institutionalise the process as it appears to be the only viable approach, under existing circumstances, to achieve socioeconomic developmental objectives.

The writer is a former adviser for planning & development to the Sindh chief minister.

Source: http://www.dawn.com/2011/10/11/a-different-paradigm.html