Showing posts with label End Game. Show all posts
Showing posts with label End Game. Show all posts

Friday, 14 October 2011

Reuters: US not sincere about Afghan peace: Haqqanis


ISLAMABAD: The United States was not sincere about peace in Afghanistan when it signalled it would remain open to exploring a settlement that includes the Haqqani network, one of the group’s senior commanders said on Thursday.
US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton suggested in comments this week that Washington would not shut the door to the Haqqanis — blamed for high-profile attacks in Afghanistan — in any peace arrangement.
The Haqqanis saw the remarks as an attempt to divide Afghan militant groups and believed only the top leaders of the Taliban should negotiate, said the commander.
“We had rejected many such offers from the United States in the past and reject this new offer as we are not authorised to decide the future of Afghanistan,” he told Reuters.
The senior Haqqani commander denied that Jamil Haqqani, who was killed in a drone attack on Thursday, had links with the group.
However, an intelligence officer said that Jamil was a highly trusted companion of Sirajuddin. He had been with the Haqqani group for a long time and was tasked with handling communications.
Jamil was Sirajuddin’s cousin, he added.—Reuters

Source: http://www.dawn.com/2011/10/14/us-not-sincere-about-afghan-peace-haqqanis.html

Aiders and abettors by Kamran Shafi


The Deep State is not alone in its enterprise of trying to fool all of the people all of the time for its own ends: it is aided and abetted by various and varied ‘elites’, most of whom have either occupied positions of high authority in government; are media ‘stars’; even Captains of private enterprise. All of them, of course, say what they do to amplify the Establishment’s views, to therefore, snuggle ever closer to it.
Some of these ‘elites’ are dishonest and hypocritical to boot, trying to be all things to all people: hawks to our own because that is the preferred attitude of the Deep State and its handmaidens in the ultra-right media which dishonestly moulds public opinion to its masters’ preferences; reasonable to the West where, incidentally, they spend most of their lives in their luxurious homes, returning to Pakistan for a few months before flying off again to spread more Deep State-inspired confusion in the various think-tanks and study groups.
On the Urdu media they flaunt Pakistan’s bums, saying in the context of the present difficulties with the United States that we should show confidence because we are a nuclear power; in the English press they go softly, softly, and become ‘reasonable’.
Case in point: the views of a former ambassador to the United States and High Commissioner to the United Kingdom as expressed on an Urdu TV channel and, a few days later, in an opinion piece in an English language newspaper. In the TV interview appearing alongside the great hawk, strategist, and ‘victor’ of Jalalabad, Hamid Gul, invoking Pakistan’s nuclear weapons; in the article advocating quiet diplomacy, and the need for both countries to make up.
This is absolutely appalling. Leave the world’s most powerful country aside, how can the reiteration of Pakistan being a nuclear weapons state help in talking and negotiating with any nation? Could the threat of nuclear bombs be a negotiating tool for any country, leave alone a desperately poor one like ours with barely a friend in the world; a country that barely keeps its head above water with periodic handouts from the IFCs and other donors?
Do we (yet!) not know that our so-called ‘deterrents’ are more like several massive, and very dead albatrosses around our country’s collective neck rather than weapons we can scare other countries with? In any case, how precisely do those that flaunt our ‘bums’ suggest Pakistan use them to its advantage? Threaten to nuke Kabul? Delhi? Bagram? Sheer madness, and yes, utter hypocrisy, for they know perfectly well that it can never be. Yet they will strike impossible attitudes.
For, despite the great game-changer introduced into this wholetamasha just last week by the Afghanistan-India Strategic Partnership Agreement, our brilliant strategists go on pinning their aspirations of one day ruling Central Asia on Pakistan’s geographic location alone. They fail to realise that Pakistan is like the spoilt little brat — whilst I used this example many years ago it holds true to-date, our strategists not having learnt a thing — who sits atop a tree flinging stones at passersby with his catapult, thinking he is beyond reach.
All it takes to fix the brat is for one of those he hits with his catapult rather hard, to one day roll up his sleeves, climb the tree, haul the whippersnapper down by his ear and give him ‘two tight slaps’ as we say in the subcontinent. I mean, look at where we are standing today, as I said before, with nary a friend in the whole wide world!
Nary a friend, did I say? We have even been reduced to whining about Turkey hosting a conference on Afghanistan in November without a-by-your-leave from us! AND inviting India to it, to boot! AND not waiting until we had used up all of our machinations trying to influence the so-called peace talks with the terrorist Taliban! The wooden-headedness, the plain mulishness of our Rommels and Guderians baffles one most completely.
And what do their propagandists do, quite shamelessly? Target the few people who do good for Pakistan, who fight its battles as best they can; who are true to their country and try to talk sense to those who call the shots?
Meanwhile, back at the ranch, 50-60 ‘students’ of the ‘Ziaul Aloom’ (fitting name, eh?) madrassa in Satellite Town, carrying iron rods, broke into the Committee Model High School for Girls located in the neighbourhood and beat up the girls and their teachers for not heeding their instructions to wear the hijab.
What is to be noted is that the local police official first said the police had been told not to react, later changing his story and saying what the hooligans did was not an ‘offence’ since they were protesting the conviction of Governor Salmaan Taseer’s assassin. So there! The Taliban are on the March again, my friends … surely sanctioned by the powers that be … for they are part and parcel of the Jihadist ‘assets’. Remember Swat?
And now for those who quote Iqbal saying Afghanistan is the heart of Asia, possibly as a means of supporting the Deep State’s seeking the holy grail of a, what is the word I want, subservient(?), Afghanistan. Let us quote the stanzas in whole, which go like this:
‘Aasia yak paikar e aab o gil ast; Millat e Afghan dar ander aan paikar dil ast; Az kushaad e oo kushaad e Aasia; Wo az fasaad e oo fasaad e Aasia’. Tr: ‘Asia is the body (made of water and dust); (but) Afghanistan is the heart; In the ruin of the heart lie the ravages of the body; In Afghanistan’s peace (and) prosperity lies the peace (and) prosperity of Asia’!
It seems to those of us who have lived the Taliban horror through the 1990s that what the Pakistani Deep State is doing/is trying to do in Afghanistan can only bring ‘ruin of the heart’ to an already ravaged body.
Have a heart, sirs!
P.S.: Kudos to Raza Rabbani and his Committee for refusing to go to GHQ to be briefed by the COAS and the DG ISI. Generals go to parliament, not the other way around. You can’t keep a good man down…

IMP: Crisis in ties with Afghanistan By Khalid Aziz


RECENTLY, President Hamid Karzai signed a strategic partnership agreement with India in New Delhi. Among other things, it provides for the training of Afghan army officers in India.
Before departing for India, President Karzai had accused Pakistan of some involvement in the murder of Burhanuddin Rabbani, the head of the Afghan High Peace Council. Irrespective of the merits of such a claim, merely the charge may have serious consequences and isolate Pakistan further during the forthcoming regional conferences in Istanbul, Bonn and later in Chicago that have been called to work out the Afghan transition.
Investigations into the death of Mr Rabbani may solve the mystery of his assassination. However, the party most threatened by peace in Afghanistan may be Al Qaeda as it would come under extensive pressure to move out of the region.
Secondly, the haste of the Indian government in pleasing Mr Karzai at the risk of harming its relationship with Pakistan may mean that another zero-sum game is in the offing. Normally, India makes decisions with prudence and after doing its homework. Can it be assumed that the agreement was actually negotiated some time ago and signed now to suit the circumstances?
The Indo-Afghan agreement gives a clear indication that it is aimed at Pakistan`s purported sphere of influence in Afghanistan. Does that mean that the US, India and Afghanistan have decided to jointly mount pressure on Pakistan? If so, this portends yet another conundrum for Pakistan.
The Indian military recently began manoeuvres near the Pakistan border in Sindh and Punjab. The simultaneous move of sophisticated Su-30 fighter jets to the region lends credence to Pakistani worries that India may be on the threshold of executing another `Cold Start` exercise to place Pakistan under pressure.
Why India would generate pressure in the region now when it is at the threshold of huge economic growth is inexplicable. One possible explanation may be Indian suspicions of a jihadi attack inside India. The exercise may be a pre-emptive message to force Pakistan to act more responsibly.
If such an event should occur, it would prove disastrous for the whole region; thus, extra care and vigilance is required of Pakistan. India`s moves and the strategic agreement are clearly meant to put Pakistan on notice regarding acting against jihadi networks in the country.
In June 2009, the US secretary of defence directed Centcom to prepare a report advising the US government on how the International Security Assistance Force (Isaf) could achieve its objectives in Afghanistan. The report was prepared by Gen McChrystal, the Isaf commander in August 2009.
It highlighted many issues related to the challenges facing the international coalition in Afghanistan. Although it was not followed in letter or spirit, the report was honest and realistic and drew some forthright conclusions that are worth revisiting.
Amongst other conclusions drawn by Gen McChrystal, an important one was that “The Afghan government has not integrated or supported traditional community governance structures — historically an important component of Afghan civil society — leaving communities vulnerable to being undermined by insurgent groups and power brokers”.
The breakdown of social cohesion at the community level has increased instability, made Afghans feel unsafe, and fuelled the insurgency. He further added: “The insurgency … is predominantly Afghan.”
If the Afghan government has been unable to increase its capacity due to various reasons, is it not possible that the death of Mr Rabbani may have been the result of ethnic rivalries or the dynamics of Afghan politics?
Then, Gen McChrystal had said that “Stability in Pakistan is essential, not only in its own right, but also to enable progress in Afghanistan. While the existence of safe havens in Pakistan does not guarantee Isaf failure, Afghanistan does require Pakistani cooperation and action against violent militancy, particularly against those groups active in Afghanistan”.
He cautioned about expanding India`s role in Afghanistan: “Increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan is likely to exacerbate regional tensions and encourage Pakistani countermeasures in Afghanistan or India.”
International politics are based on realism: relations are based on competition and conflict rather than cooperation. Realists consider states to be concerned with their own security and act in pursuit of their own national interests in their struggle for power. International politics are characterised by active or potential conflict among states.
In the current situation, the US, India, Afghanistan and Pakistan are obviously following the realism route. Pakistan, however, must calculate the cost of confronting a mounting coalition against it for its alleged support to the jihadis, including the Haqqani group.
Clearly, the survival of the Pakistani state is more important than tactical preferences. The parallels of the current crisis with the East Pakistan situation in 1971 are too close for comfort.
Pakistan`s geography on the junction of Punjab with Sindh has remained its Achilles heel. To cover this weakness, Pakistan considered Afghanistan as within its legitimate sphere of interest, and resultantly the new strategic agreement between India and Afghanistan is viewed with alarm. However, realism teaches us to watch out, for there is greater danger lurking.
The pieces on the chessboard clearly do not augur well for peace or for an orderly withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan in 2014. Common sense would suggest that the best strategy for bringing peace to the region would be to engage both India and Pakistan in a collaborative mode for the endgame in Afghanistan.
Such a result may best be achieved by the appointment of a special representative of the secretary general of the United Nations with a mandate to expeditiously consult the states concerned on how to create a regional consultative mechanism to ensure peace in Afghanistan and an orderly drawdown of forces by 2014 while also assisting in maintaining regional security.
The writer is the chairman of the Regional Institute of Policy Research in Peshawar.

Wednesday, 12 October 2011

US open to Afghan peace deal including Haqqani: Clinton


WASHINGTON: US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on Tuesday signalled that the United States remains open to exploring a peace deal including the Haqqani network, the militant group that US officials blame for a campaign of high-profile violence that could jeopardise Washington’s plans for withdrawing smoothly from Afghanistan.
“Where we are right now is that we view the Haqqanis and other of their ilk as, you know, being adversaries and being very dangerous to Americans, Afghans and coalition members inside Afghanistan, but we are not shutting the door on trying to determine whether there is some path forward,” Clinton said when asked whether she believed members of the Haqqani network might reconcile with the Afghan government.
“It’s too soon to tell whether any of these groups or any individuals within them are serious,” she said in an interview with Reuters.
Inclusion of the Haqqani network in a hoped-for peace deal — now a chief objective in the Obama administration’s Afghanistan policy after a decade of war — is a controversial idea in Washington.
Officials blame the group for last month’s attack on the US embassy in Kabul and a truck bombing that injured scores of American soldiers.
The State Department is facing heat from Capitol Hill for refraining, at least so far, from officially designating the Haqqani group, which US officials say is based in western Pakistan, as a terrorist organisation.
The White House has backed away from assertions from Admiral Mike Mullen, who was the top US military officer until he retired last month, that Pakistani intelligence supported the Haqqani network in the September 13 embassy attack.
But President Barack Obama and others have put their sometimes-ally Pakistan on notice that it must crack down on militants or risk severing a key relationship.
According to media reports, US officials have held meetings with Haqqani network representatives as part of their efforts — which have not yet yielded any visible results — to strike a peace deal, but the State Department declines to discuss details of the reconciliation process.
In recent months reconciliation has become a more prominent feature of Obama’s Afghan strategy even as US and Nato soldiers continued to battle the Taliban and Haqqani militants in Afghanistan’s volatile south and east.
Earlier this year, Clinton advanced a peace deal as a key plank of regional policy for the first time, saying Washington would support a settlement between the Afghan government and those militant groups that meet certain requirements, including renouncing violence and supporting the Afghan constitution.
Fighting, talking
Despite the conciliatory signals, Clinton said the United States would stick to its military campaign that the White House hopes will make militants more likely to enter serious negotiations.
“Now, it is also true that we are still trying to kill and capture or neutralise them (the Haqqani network),” Clinton said. “And they are still trying to, you know, kill as many Americans, Afghans and coalition members as they can.”
“In many instances where there is an ongoing conflict, you are fighting and looking to talk,” Clinton said. “And then eventually maybe you are fighting and talking. And then maybe you’ve got a cease-fire. And then maybe you are just talking.”
It is unclear how quickly a peace deal could be had, as it remains unclear how military commanders can achieve and defend security improvements as the foreign force in Afghanistan gradually grows smaller.
While parts of the Taliban’s southern heartland are safer than they were, Obama will be withdrawing the extra troops he sent to Afghanistan in 2010 just as commanders’ focus turns to the rugged eastern regions where the Haqqani group are believed to operate.
Clinton did not directly address the question of designating the Haqqani network as a ‘foreign terrorist organisation,’ but suggested the United States would want to keep its options open as it seeks peace in a region known for historic merry-go-round of political and military alliances.
“It’s always difficult in this stage of a conflict, as you think through what is the resolution you are seeking and how do you best obtain it, to really know where you’ll be in two months, four months, six months,” Clinton said.
“We are going to support the Afghans and they want to continue to see whether there is any way forward or whether you can see some of the groups or their leaders willing to break with others.”

Repairing frayed ties By Michael O’Hanlon


AFTER a year of calamitous turns in the relationship between Washington and Islamabad, many Americans are wondering how this troubled alliance can possibly be repaired. Even more may be wondering how we can simply extricate ourselves from it, finding other partners and other strategic options in South Asia.
Alas, Pakistanis have had similar doubts about America even longer, a fact that goes far towards explaining their hedging behaviour, as many in the nation’s military and intelligence services tolerate or even support the Haqqani network and Quetta Shura Taliban in ways that destabilise Afghanistan and lead to the deaths of Afghans as well as Nato troops.
Certainly it seems safe to conclude that Pakistan is America’s most complex ally since Stalin’s Soviet Union, a poster child for what a foreign ‘frenemy’ looks like for the United States.
To be sure, we need to arrest this downturn in US-Pakistan relations to the extent we can. But it is at least as important that we Americans help our Afghan partners rework their relationship with Pakistan. In fact, that may be the core essence of the problem we face, and progress on this front may prove the most plausible path to improved US-Pakistan relations as well.
This will not be easy. Ten years into this war, I must say that for many Americans, it is hard to believe any longer Pakistan’s explanation for its hedging behaviour — that it simply does not have enough troops to fully pacify its tribal areas, and that it also needs to keep some friendly proxies in place should Nato’s effort to stabilise Afghanistan fail.
As for the first excuse, while partly valid, it does not explain the active collaboration between some elements of the ISI and the Afghan insurgents. And the second is not justifiable when the United States and other foreign countries have proven their mettle with a 10-year effort in this conflict to date, as well as a promise to take three more years to leave Afghanistan gradually and responsibly.
Indeed, as we have repeatedly stated at various levels of government (with only Joe Biden going off message for a moment in recent months, but later correcting himself), the United States in particular does not intend to leave Afghanistan even after 2014. Americans need to keep driving home this message to Pakistanis until it sinks in. Indeed, in my judgment, the only likely way the Afghanistan effort could fail is if Pakistani actions lead it to fail.
But it may be even more productive to directly confront, and attempt to address where possible, Pakistani concerns about certain aspects of the relationship between Islamabad and Kabul. To the extent that Pakistan’s government worries about an India-friendly Afghan government that would create security concerns on its western borders, leading to a form of strategic encirclement of Pakistan by India as well as Indian allies, there are steps that Afghanistan supported by Washington can take.
They will not suffice to eliminate all such Pakistani paranoias, but they can make a difference — and even incremental steps can help in this situation.
Consider the following possible moves. They need not be made unilaterally, but can be offered by Afghanistan as quid pro quos for Pakistan agreeing to rein in the Haqqani network and the Quetta Shura:
— Building on the results of President Karzai’s recent trip to India, where New Delhi and Kabul agreed that India would help train Afghan security forces, promise Pakistan that such training will occur only under the auspices of Nato’s training mission in Afghanistan.
This will reduce Pakistani fears that India will develop close rapport with certain units of the Afghan army that might work in cahoots with traditionally pro-India Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance elements and leave Islamabad out in the cold.
— Ask India to kindly close its consulates in eastern and southern Afghanistan.
Pakistan sees these Indian outposts in Jalalabad and Kandahar as intelligence collection sites and covert action staging bases in disguise. I doubt very much that is the case. No matter; the consulates are not important enough to warrant the reaction they cause, and Afghanistan should be willing to ask India to shut them down.
— Promise to respect the Durand Line between the two nations as the effective border indefinitely, or at least for an extended period, say until 2050.
Afghans continue to resist simply accepting this admittedly arbitrary British-drawn line from more than a century ago as their formal boundary with Pakistan. But even if the Durand Line is arbitrary, it makes little sense for small, weak Afghanistan to pick a fight with its big neighbour over where the border should be, especially since what is at stake are remote mountain regions that are hardly the heartland of either country. Even if Afghans cannot bring themselves to concede the border permanently, it should be possible to take the issue off the table for the foreseeable future
— Establish an Afghan-Pakistan border management body with high-level government participation on both sides.
This body could address various means of enhancing economic cooperation. It could allow for intelligence-sharing and tactical military communication and cooperation near the border, where insurgents cross in both directions and threaten both countries. Importantly, it could also allow Pakistan a chance to convey its preferences about who among the Haqqanis or other major tribes might be accorded government jobs in Afghanistan’s eastern provinces.
Of course, Islamabad should not get to choose Afghanistan’s local leaders, but there is no reason to deprive it of a chance to advocate for certain interests. In fact, Afghanistan might do the same in reverse, pointing out its concerns and sharing its preferences for what Pakistan does in some of the tribal areas and other border regions of its own country.
It will not be easy to make progress across all these issues. But for those looking for a fruitful way to have peace talks in regard to Afghanistan, this sort of conversation between the two legitimate governments of the key countries at issue is a much more promising arena for diplomacy than are high-level peace talks between Afghanistan and the Taliban.
The writer is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

Monday, 10 October 2011

China factor in Afghanistan


THE signing of the India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership last week reaffirmed the establishment’s narratives about Pakistan’s real concerns across its western border: it’s not about militancy or instability, but about Indian hegemony.
The timing of the pact, and its focus on security cooperation, intimates Pakistan’s nightmare scenario of encirclement by India. Former military ruler Pervez Musharraf pointed to the pact as proof that India is seeking to create “an anti-Pakistan Afghanistan”. And so we’re back to binaries: India versus Pakistan in a potential proxy war in Afghanistan.
But things are never as straightforward as they seem. Most political dynamics in South Asia are seen through the bilateral lens of tense India-Pakistan relations. However, in most cases, those tensions are actually trilateral, with Sino-Indian tensions playing out in the background. Afghanistan is no exception.
In recent days, Pakistan has dwelled on the Strategic Partnership between New Delhi and Kabul because of the security implications of India playing a bigger role in training Afghan security forces. This narrow focus has prevented Islamabad from emphasising the significance of two other pacts signed by India and Afghanistan last week. One MoU calls for enhanced cooperation in the exploration and production of hydrocarbons, primarily oil and gas. A second MoU, signed between the Indian and Afghan ministries of mines, calls for promoting mineral exploration and investment in Afghanistan’s mines.
These MoUs were signed in the same week that it was revealed that the China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) — the largest state-owned Chinese company — has won the rights to explore and develop oil fields in Afghanistan’s Amu Darya basin.
Writing in Foreign Policy, Alexander Benard and Eli Sugarman explain that Amu Darya contains five known fields containing 80 million barrels of crude oil, which amounts to 11,000 barrels per day for 20 years.
It is no secret that the Chinese government covets Afghanistan’s natural resources. In 2007, China won another major tender for the Aynak copper deposit, estimated to be worth $80bn. Indeed, China has recently invested in various Central Asian natural resources to supply energy and raw materials for its booming industries.
Rather than obsess purely about India’s security designs in Afghanistan vis-à-vis Pakistan, Islamabad should also plan for the China factor. It is clear that India and China are competing for access to Afghanistan’s rich mineral and energy resources. It is also clear that this competition fuels some of New Delhi’s strategic thinking regarding its presence in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s repeated failure to account for India’s concerns about China in a security and nuclear context has driven the country into an endless arms race.
Billions have been spent on conventional and nuclear weapons as Pakistan tries to compete with the testy economic powerhouses on its periphery. Before it makes the same mistake in Afghanistan, Pakistan should account for the fact that there are more than two players interested in present-day Afghanistan. Leaving India aside, Pakistan should also consider the medium- and long-term ramifications of Chinese investment in Afghanistan.
On the positive side, Pakistan could find ways to collaborate with China on its extractive and energy-related initiatives in Afghanistan. Such an involvement would expand Pakistan’s interface with Afghanistan beyond political interference to substantial investment and infrastructure development work. Given Pakistan’s worsening energy crisis, any additional options for access to energy must be pursued.
The political benefits of Chinese presence in Afghanistan are also worth noting: as a major investor in Afghanistan’s natural resource industries, China will also enjoy a fair amount of political influence in Kabul. The durability of the Sino-Pak relationship suggests that Beijing would intervene with Kabul in the future if Afghanistan chose to pursue policies hostile to Pakistan. Knowing that China would defend Pakistani interests should give Islamabad the confidence not to pursue paranoid or self-destructive policies in the name of ‘strategic depth’.
Of course, an expanded Chinese presence in Afghanistan could work against Pakistan, but only if Islamabad continues to pursue its current tack of backing militant groups as proxies. Beijing will have little patience for militants receiving Pakistani support if they in any way detract from China’s ability to reap the benefits of its investments (for example, if poor security prevents CNPC from exploring the oil fields at Amu Darya). Right now, China is letting the US do the dirty work of slapping Pakistan on the wrist for backing militant groups. Once US troops withdraw from the region in 2014, we can expect China to take a harder line: remember, it was on Beijing’s insistence that the Pakistan Army conducted Operation Silence at Lal Masjid in 2007.
China will also not tolerate any activities that could lead to a full-blown confrontation between Pakistan and India. While Beijing and New Delhi are engaged in fierce competition on the global stage, they also enjoy a significant trading relationship.
China does seven times more trade with India than it does with Pakistan, and is India’s largest trading partner, even over the US. China is aware that its long-standing strategic partnership with Pakistan would disrupt these strong economic ties in the event of a crisis. For that reason, it will pressurise Pakistan in the medium term to abandon the use of proxies against Indian interests in Afghanistan.
Finally, Beijing will probably bring in low-cost labour from China to work on extractive and explorative projects in Afghanistan. The last thing China needs is for these workers to become radicalised as a result of exposure to Pakistan-backed militant groups before returning to the mainland.
In sum, Pakistan’s adherence to the proxy war narrative is likely to prove misguided and counterproductive in years to come.
In the context of Chinese interests in Afghanistan, it also threatens to leave Pakistan isolated, even from its closest allies.

Sunday, 9 October 2011

UK review identifies Afghan civil war risk

LONDON: A British government review of the Afghan conflict is to warn that there are “significant risks” of civil war or a Taliban takeover of the south and east of the country after Nato withdraws its combat troops at the end of the 2014.
On the 10th anniversary of the start of the war, military progress is patchy with fighting still intense in the east and in parts of Helmand province. Over the past few days, British troops have been sent in to the thick of a bloody, drawn-out struggle along the Helmand river valley, taking over a fiercely contested area from US marines a few kilometres south of Sangin town, the site of the UK’s heaviest losses since its forces moved into the province in 2006.
With three years to go until Afghan security forces are supposed to fight the insurgency without the help of foreign combat troops, the Afghanistan review will portray a country in turmoil. Last year’s 30,000-strong US troop surge and new counterinsurgency tactics have pushed the Taliban out of much of the territory it controlled a year ago, but with the widespread use of improvised mines and roadside bombs, as well as a campaign of assassinations, the insurgents have sought to paralyse the Kabul government and hinder western-backed development.
Retired US general Stanley McChrystal, the former commander of the Nato-led International Security Assistance Force (Isaf), said the force was only “50% of the way” to achieving its goals in the country.
President Hamid Karzai’s administration remains weak and corrupt, reliant on a loose coalition of warlords. The country’s biggest bank has been crippled by rampant embezzlement, and there have been a string of assassinations of high-profile Karzai allies, culminating last month in the killing of the government top peace envoy, Burhanuddin Rabbani.
The British government review, ordered by the prime minister David Cameron earlier this year and due to be delivered in mid-November, will warn of significant risks of the recent, hard-won progress unravelling and the very real threat of a multi-dimensional civil war between insurgent factions, regional and tribal groups, fuelled by neighbouring powers jockeying for position.
Talibanisation of the Pakhtun belt
Another possible outcome is referred to as the “Talibanisation of the Pakhtun belt”, in which the Pakhtun areas on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border slip permanently under the control of ultra-conservative militants, further destabilising Pakistan, an already fragile state armed with nuclear weapons.
The report, as described by officials, will make clear that these remain worst-case scenarios which can be avoided. But even the outcome judged by the report to be most likely after the 2014 transition, a precarious Afghan state with pockets of chronic violence, would leave the terrorist threat from the region as potent as it is today.
A senior British diplomat would not comment on the specifics of the review as it is classified and has yet to be finalised, but confirmed that “those sorts of scenarios are being studied”. “It is going to be a cold-eyed realistic appraisal,” the diplomat said.
The 20 September killing of Rabbani by a suicide bomber with explosives concealed in his turban, has set back hopes of a negotiated settlement with the Taliban. While senior Nato officials believe the evidence leads back to the Taliban’s Pakistan haven in Quetta, they do not think the assassination was specifically ordered by the top leadership, but rather was the work of an over-zealous second-tier commander. That leaves open the possibility that informal US contacts, begun last year, could resume.
But levels of distrust, both between Nato and the Taliban, and between Rabbani’s northern kinsmen and rebel Pakhtun tribes in the south, are now higher than ever.
“Anyone who is following the situation in Afghanistan is worried. A civil war is a real possibility,” said Martine van Bijlert of the Kabul-based Afghanistan Analysts Network.
“There is a real feeling of instability, that the future is unsure. People don’t know who are their friends and enemies. So they try to make themselves ready for any eventuality, positioning themselves politically and worrying about how strong they are.
People are falling back on old networks and old loyalties.”
In Helmand, last year’s influx of 11,000 of US marines has suppressed the insurgency in several districts and reduced the pressure on British troops garrisoned in the province. But Barack Obama is now drawing down the surge, and the troops are going home or redploying to the eastern provinces to counter the threat of splinter jihadist groups.
Three hundred British soldiers are currently being deployed with Afghan troops along a particularly volatile stretch of the Helmand river south of Sangin, replacing a US marine battalion that was unable to make progress against the local insurgents and found itself under daily attack, suffering five deaths over six months and more than 80 wounded.
Danish forces stationed further south towards the town of Gereshk were forced to withdraw earlier this year from a forward base known as Armadillo as a result of an insurgent onslaught, dismantling the fortifications stone by stone and shipping part of it back to a military museum in Denmark.
Not a lot has changed
The newly-arrived British troops and their Afghan counterparts will be patrolling an area known as Qal Yeh Gaz, just 12kms south of Sangin town. One of the departing US marines, Captain Andrew Terrell told the BBC that “not a lot has changed” since he was deployed nearby with British commandos four years ago. “The situation is no better. The people here are not fed up with the fighting, they’ve not reached the limit of what they’re willing to accept from the Taliban,” Terrell said. “It’s easier for them to move out of the area and hope it settles down, but they don’t look much further than tomorrow.”
A coalition of Afghan and western aid agencies has published research suggesting that despite the influx of $57bn in foreign aid since 2001, progress in health, education and a public sense of security has been patchy and tenuous.
Farhana Faruqi Stocker, the director of Afghanaid said: “Investments have been made where there is the greatest insurgency rather than where there is the greatest need. Impoverished regions have been ignored because they are ‘secure’.” She added: “Afghan lives have improved but the gains are fragile and reversible.”—Dawn/Guardian News Service
Source: http://www.dawn.com/2011/10/09/uk-review-identifies-afghan-civil-war-risk.html

Saturday, 8 October 2011

India may rue the day it backed Afghan regime

NEW DELHI: India’s decision to underwrite and, in effect, guarantee Hamid Karzai’s feeble Afghan government is not wholly lacking in logic. In a strategic pact signed on Tuesday, the two countries pledged to co-operate on trade and counter-terrorism, and Delhi agreed to train and equip Afghan security forces. With US and Nato forces edging towards the exit in 2014, it follows that Delhi, the region’s military and economic heavyweight and an aspiring superpower, should take up the strategic slack. But that is not how Pakistan or the Taliban will see the newly announced bilateral security, political and commercial “partnership”. India may yet pay heavily for its presumption.
India’s role, or “meddling”, in Afghanistan is already viewed with enormous suspicion in Islamabad, which nurtures a visceral fear of encirclement arising from its bruising, losing wars with its neighbour.
“Pakistan has pursued a double game toward Afghanistan, and using terrorism as a means continues,” Karzai complained this week before travelling to India. Pakistan — or at least elements of its security services — has been accused by Kabul of
complicity in last month’s murder of Burhanuddin Rabbani, the former Afghan president and peace talks negotiator. India, meanwhile, has detected Pakistan’s hand in the bombing of its Kabul embassy in 2008 and 2009, as well as terrorist attacks on Indian soil. Pakistan denies all the allegations.
Demonstrating that he, too, can play both sides against the middle, Karzai offered reassurances on Wednesday that the partnership deal with India was not aimed at Islamabad. “Pakistan is a twin brother, India is a great friend. The agreement that we signed yesterday with our friend will not affect our brother … the signing of the strategic partnership with India is not directed against any country. It is not directed against any other entity,” he said.
Karzai’s sudden attack of tact is not born of bonhomie. It reflects the political reality that a lasting settlement in Afghanistan is impossible without Pakistan’s agreement, or at least acquiescence. Karzai’s attempt to sweeten the pill may also reflect his desire to keep open the possibility of a negotiated settlement with the many-headed Taliban despite the continuing insurgent violence. The Taliban will not have forgotten India’s backing of the non-Pashtun Northern Alliance in the 1990s, which eventually swept them from power in 2001 with US help. The idea of India playing an enhanced security role inside Afghanistan, as agreed in Delhi this week, is thus likely to be rejected by them as more unwelcome foreign interference. Karzai noted bitterly last week that if peace were ever to come to Afghanistan, his government needed to talk to Pakistan, not India or the US.
India has been expanding its involvement in Afghanistan since 2001, opening provincial consulates, embarking on road and infrastructure programmes, and donating about $2bn in bilateral aid. But this week’s agreement represents a substantial and risky increased commitment. Nobody in Delhi is talking about Indian troops or security forces on the ground in Afghanistan.
But the Afghan forces training role India has accepted marks it out as Nato’s successor, and potentially a target for insurgent wrath.
Manmohan Singh, India’s prime minister, seemed to brush aside such concerns when he met Karzai. “India will stand by the people of Afghanistan as they prepare to assume responsibility for governance and security after the withdrawal of international forces in 2014,” Singh said. These are fateful words. They may come back to haunt the Indians.India’s leaders one day may come to rue their vainglorious generosity in picking up the hot potato that the US, Britain and the rest all gingerly dropped. It seems a high price to pay for outflanking Pakistan